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The debate over the climate change crisis is no longer about 
whether global warming is fact or fiction, rather it is about how 
and when to address the effects of climate change.  Scientists 
agree that global warming is negatively impacting the Earth’s 
water supply, wildlife habitats, coastal communities, air and 
water quality, biodiversity, and forests, among others.  Leading 
scientists indicate that the time frame for action is as short as ten 
years.1  Consequently, now is the time to act; the problem cannot 
be solved with individual voluntary action.  If the Earth is to 
stand a chance, governments across the globe must force changes 
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in human behavior immediately.2  Specifically, public officials in 
the United States need to make climate change a top priority–
something that they have collectively failed to do up to this 
point.  Inaction by public officials in the United States is 
resulting in deterioration of public trust assets in which public 
officials have a duty as trustees to protect.  Public officials must 
be held liable for disregarding and neglecting this duty if we are 
going to get their attention.  Because of the political system in 
the United States, public officials acting as trustees of the public 
trust are ignoring their duties of loyalty to the public trust 
beneficiaries and are intertwined in personal and political 
conflicts of interest that are incongruous with their trust duties.  
Something must be done to force government to address this 
critical matter. 
Parts I and II of this Article provide an overview of the 
climate change crisis and the public trust doctrine.  Part III 
discusses trusts generally and the difference between private and 
public trusts.  Part IV discusses the duties owed by the trustee to 
the trust beneficiaries; specifically, the trustee’s duty of loyalty 
and the several sources from which the duty is derived.  Part V 
takes an in-depth look at the types of conflicts of interest 
confronted by trustees and trustees’ agents in their 
administrative capacity.  Recent examples from federal agencies 
are provided to demonstrate how conflicts of interests influence 
decisions that impact the public trust.  Finally, Part VI ties the 
trust principles, trust duties, and trustee conflicts of interest 
together and suggests future actions to attract the trustee’s 
attention. 
I 
THE CLIMATE CHANGE CRISIS 
The documented rise in the Earth’s temperature, commonly 
known as global warming, has resulted in global climate change.3  
The Earth’s increased temperature is the result of an increase in 
 
2 See Doug Struck, U.N. Global Warming Report Sternly Warns Against Inaction, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2007, at A3. 
3 For a complete explanation of global warming dynamics, see Global Warming 
FAQ, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/ 
science_and_impacts/science (follow “Global Warming FAQ” hyperlink) (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2009). 
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heat-trapping gases in the Earth’s atmosphere.4  Until now, the 
greenhouse effect naturally kept the atmosphere within a 
temperature range that allowed life to exist on Earth.5  The 
greenhouse effect occurs when the sun’s energy warms the 
Earth’s surface and atmosphere.6  This heat then radiates back 
toward space and a portion is absorbed by heat-trapping gases in 
the atmosphere, specifically carbon dioxide and methane.7  This 
greenhouse effect creates an insulating layer in the Earth’s 
atmosphere that acts like a temperature control, keeping the 
Earth at an average surface temperature of fifty-nine degrees 
Fahrenheit.8  Without the temperature-regulating greenhouse 
effect, the Earth would have an average temperature of zero 
degrees Fahrenheit, a temperature much too low to sustain life.9 
Scientists around the world have concluded that human 
activities, such as driving cars, utilizing coal-fired power plants, 
engaging in deforestation, and raising cattle are significantly 
contributing to global warming.10  This is because these and other 
activities emit large amounts of heat-trapping gases into the 
atmosphere.11  Since the Industrial Revolution, humans have 
burned massive quantities of fossil fuels and in doing so have 
emitted so many greenhouse gases that it has changed the 
composition of the Earth’s atmosphere.12  During this period, the 
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has increased by 31 
percent and methane has increased by 151 percent.13  As 
increased greenhouse gases are emitted into the atmosphere, the 
concentration of these gases increases; thus, less heat escapes 
and more heat is trapped on Earth.14  This increase in 
 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.; see also Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: A Legal, Political and Moral 
Frame for Global Warming, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 577, 578 (2007). 
13 Global Warming FAQ, supra note 3. 
14 Id. 
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greenhouse gas concentration levels has affected and altered 
weather patterns all over the world.15 
The effects of changing weather patterns impact natural 
habitats needed for life to survive.  For instance, the polar ice 
cap in Greenland and glaciers worldwide are melting, which is 
negatively impacting native people and wildlife and literally 
sinking beachfronts and coastal communities.16  Scientists predict 
that global warming will result in the loss of crops, shortages of 
food, and loss of coastlines, as well as drought, wildfires, 
increased severity of hurricanes and tornadoes, heat waves, 
landslides, vanishing snowpack, and species extinctions.17 
So what does this information tell us about the condition of 
the Earth’s climate today?  It tells us we are facing a grave 
problem and action must be taken now.  Jim Hansen, the leading 
climate scientist for NASA, warned in 2006 that we have ten 
years at most, “not ten years to decide upon action, but ten years 
to alter fundamentally the trajectory of global greenhouse 
emissions.”18  Hansen continues to argue that we are nearing a 
“tipping point.”19  The tipping point is the point at which carbon 
levels reach such a height that successive actions to reduce 
carbon emissions will not prevent long-term disaster from 
occurring.20  Specifically, the climbing trajectory of greenhouse 
gas emissions must be reversed within the next ten years, and we 
must reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to below eighty 
percent of 1990 levels by 2050.21  The United States is one of the 
largest producers of carbon emissions in the world;22 thus, it must 
 
15 Id. 
16 See generally U.N. FOUNDATION & SIGMA XI, CONFRONTING CLIMATE 
CHANGE: AVOIDING THE UNMANAGEABLE AND MANAGING THE UNAVOIDABLE 
19 (2007), available at http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/unf 
_website/PDF/climate%20_change_avoid_unmanagable_manage_unavoidable.pdf. 
17 Wood, supra note 12 at 581–82; see also Global Warming FAQ, supra note 3. 
18 Jim Hansen, The Threat to the Planet, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 13, 2006, at 
12, 16. 
19 Id. 
20 Wood, supra note 12, at 586. 
21 Hansen, supra note 18; see also, NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 223 (2006). 
22 Each Country’s Share of Global CO2 Emissions, Union of Concerned 
Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2009) (follow “Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions” hyperlink 
under “Tools & Resources”). 
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act now through all levels of government to help prevent 
reaching the tipping point. 
II 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The public trust doctrine is a common law doctrine that holds 
some natural resources in trust to be protected by the sovereign, 
the governing body, for future generations.23  In 1845, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held in Pollard v. Hagan that the states owned 
streambeds within their borders and that it was critical that 
states retained ownership because those lands supported fishing, 
navigation, and commerce–activities important to the 
functioning of society.24 
The early key case defining the public trust doctrine is Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.  The U.S. Supreme Court held 
that an implied public trust came with submersible lands along 
navigable waterways so that the people of the state could engage 
in navigation, commerce, and fishing within the waterways.25  
Additionally, the Court held that states could convey the 
submersible lands to private parties; however, the land carried 
with it a public trust duty to not substantially impair the public 
trust interest.26  Thus, the duty restricts the property owner’s use 
of the land.27  The Court explained that “[t]he control of the state 
for the purposes of the trust can never be lost.”28  Therefore, 
private property owners who acquire title to public trust lands 
will never acquire full title.29  Consequently, the public trust 
doctrine allows the state to force reacquisition of the lands 
without having to compensate the property owner because the 
property owner never had full title in ownership.30 
Public trust assets have expanded over time to include more 
than navigable waterways.  Public trust assets now include 
 
23 JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 622 (2006). 
24 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 215, 229 (1845). 
25 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892). 
26 Id. at 453. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 455. 
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wetlands, lakes, parks, trees, beaches, and wildlife.31  Because the 
climate change crisis has a direct impact on these public trust 
assets, the climate change crisis needs to and should be 
addressed from the public trust context.  If the public trust 
doctrine is going to operate as a trust–for the protection of 
natural resources for future generations–then the sovereign has 
an explicit duty to protect trust assets from damage and 
depletion resulting from the climate change crisis.  The sovereign 
trustees must act to defend the trust against injury, and where 
the trust is damaged, the trustee must restore the trust assets.32  It 
is this duty held by the sovereign that links together the climate 
change crisis and the public trust doctrine. 
III 
TRUSTS 101 
To better understand the public trust doctrine, one must know 
what a trust is, how private and public trusts differ, and the 
duties encumbered in a trust.  Generally, a trust creates a 
fiduciary relationship where a trustee holds title to the property 
of another for the benefit of the beneficiary.33  The two primary 
types of trusts are private trusts and charitable trusts.34  For the 
purpose of this discussion, private trusts are emphasized. 
Private trust elements include: (1) an asset placed into trust 
(2) with a trustee who takes possession of the assets (3) for the 
purpose of protecting the assets against loss or damage and (4) 
maximizing the productivity of the assets.35  Private trustees have 
several fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of the trust.  
Trustees’ duties include but are not limited to the following: 
administer the trust, afford loyalty to the beneficiary of the trust, 
refrain from delegating the trust, communicate and provide 
information about the trust, act only in the best interest of the 
trust beneficiary, exercise reasonable care and skill, preserve 
 
31 LAITOS ET AL., supra note 23, at 349. 
32 Wood, supra note 1, at 262. 
33 Sally K. Fairfax & Andrea Issod, Trust Principles as a Tool for Grazing 
Reform: Learning from Four State Cases, 33 ENVTL. L. 341, 347 (2003); see also 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (8th ed. 2004). 
34 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 33, at 1546. 
35 Daniel P. Kapsak, Cause of Action Against Trustee Management of Trust 
Assets, in 21 CAUSES OF ACTION 575, § 1 (2007); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 174 (2005). 
 2008] Protection of Public Trust Assets 525 
property, make trust property productive, pay income to the 
beneficiary, and deal impartially with the beneficiary.36 
Several private trust elements and fiduciary duties are present 
in a public trust.  Like a private trust, a public trust has assets 
that are placed in the possession of another (government) for the 
purpose of protecting those assets and maximizing their 
productivity.  Thus, the public trust doctrine places assets 
(natural resources) in the hands of the trustee (the sovereign at 
all government levels) to protect against loss and maximize trust 
productivity for future use by the beneficiaries (generations to 
come).  Also as in a private trust, several fiduciary duties are 
encumbered in the public trust structure.  Specifically, in a public 
trust, the trustee has a duty to protect and preserve the asset, a 
duty to protect the asset from waste, and a duty of loyalty to the 
beneficiaries.37  Other duties borrowed from the private trust 
structure include the duty to provide information about trust 
actions and the trust’s status to the beneficiaries (communication 
and disclosure)38 and a duty to act prudently when deciding if 
and how to delegate trustee authority.39 
IV 
TRUSTEE DUTIES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 
A trustee’s duty of loyalty is a heavy-weighted fiduciary duty 
that requires a trustee to act and operate in a manner with the 
utmost loyalty to the trust beneficiaries.40  In essence, the duty of 
loyalty encompasses all other trustee duties, requiring the 
trustee to make all trust decisions based on what is in the best 
interest of the beneficiaries and, ultimately, the trust assets.  The 
trustee’s duty of loyalty is derived from constitutions, common 
law, oaths of office, statutes, and regulations. 
Almost all states, through constitutions and judicial opinions, 
require government management of natural resources for the 
benefit of the public.41  In so doing, many states have imposed 
 
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 169–183. 
37 LAITOS ET AL., supra note 23, at 623. 
38 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 356 (2005). 
39 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892); Kapsak, supra note 35, 
at § 2. 
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174. 
41 LAITOS ET AL., supra note 23, at 349. 
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upon the government an implied or express duty of loyalty in the 
management of the public trust.42  For example, the Rhode 
Island State Constitution states: 
[I]t shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for the 
conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral and 
other natural resources of the state, and to adopt all means 
necessary and proper by law to protect the natural 
environment of the people of the state by providing adequate 
resource planning for the control and regulation of the use of 
the natural resources of the state and for the preservation, 
regeneration and restoration of the natural environment of the 
state.43 
The public trust doctrine and the duties encumbered by the 
sovereign trustees are historically rooted in common law.  In 
addition to Illinois Central, there are copious state judicial 
opinions that echo the philosophies in the Rhode Island State 
Constitution pertaining to the trust and the trustee’s duties.44 
In an 1896 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Justice White wrote: 
[T]he power or control lodged in the state, resulting from this 
common ownership [of natural resources], is to be exercised, 
like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit 
of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the 
government . . . or for the benefit of private individuals as 
distinguished from the public good. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he ownership of the sovereign authority is in trust for 
all the people of the state; and hence, by implication, it is the 
duty of the legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve 
the subject of the trust, and secure its beneficial use in the 
future to the people of the state.45 
 
42 See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4; see also HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ILL. CONST. 
art. XI, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
43 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17; see also Thomas R. Bender, Legislative Control Over 
the Coastal Resources Management Council After Separation of Powers, 12 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 314, 321–22 (2007). 
44 See, e.g., Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1991); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Priewe 
v. Wis. State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896).  For a complete 
discussion of these cases and others, see LAITOS ET AL., supra note 23, at 623 
(stating that there are now over one hundred cases interpreting the public trust 
doctrine on the state level). 
45 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529, 534 (1896). 
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Without using the term “duty of loyalty,” Justice White 
described the duty of loyalty that the state must embrace as the 
trustee. 
The duty of loyalty as related to the public trust has even 
older roots than late nineteenth-century legal cases; it was found 
throughout Native American culture and governance long 
before Anglo-Saxons settled in North America.46  As Professor 
Mary Wood has said: “The very core of [Indian] governmental 
responsibility was preserving resources for future generations . . . 
[as] both a religious principle and a principle of governance.”47  
Tribal leaders were custodians of the tribe’s natural resources; 
thus, they had an inherent duty to protect and preserve the 
natural resources for future generations.48 
The sovereign’s duty of loyalty is often promised to its people 
when individual public officials take an oath of office.  An oath 
is a legally binding pledge and is “reserved for human activities 
of the highest order.”49  The U.S. Constitution prescribes certain 
oath requirements for the president, U.S. senators and 
representatives, members of state legislatures, and federal and 
state executive and judicial officers.50  The presidential oath is 
specified in Article II, Section 1, Clause 8 and provides: “I do 
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of 
my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.”51  The phrases “best of my Ability” and 
“preserve, protect and defend the Constitution” equate to a 
promise of loyalty to serve the people.  Additionally, state and 
local government employees often have to take an oath of office  
 
46 Wood, supra note 1, at 265; see also Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and 
the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 
1471 passim (1994). 
47 Wood, supra note 1, at 265. 
48 Id. (stating that tribal leaders were “stewards of the plants, the animals, the 
waters, and the air”). 
49 JOHN A. ROHR, PUBLIC SERVICE, ETHICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 
70–71 (1998). 
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring a presidential oath of office); U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (requiring an oath of office for U.S. senators, U.S. 
representatives, state legislators, and executive and judicial officers); 5 U.S.C. § 
3331 (2006) (spelling out the oath of office for civil or military servicemembers). 
51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
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that is typically prescribed in state constitutions and statutes.52  
Many oaths include not only a clause to uphold the Constitution 
but also a clause to uphold the laws of the state and/or local 
ordinances.53  In sum, when taking an oath of office, a public 
official expresses a promise of loyalty to the people and to 
uphold, preserve, and protect the laws of the jurisdiction. 
Promises made when taking an oath of office are directly 
related to public trust principles in a few ways.  First, although 
not expressly stated in the Constitution, the public trust doctrine 
is implied in the Constitution, through the equal footing 
doctrine, navigational servitude doctrine, and the Commerce 
Clause.54  Consequently, when a public official promises to 
uphold the Constitution to the best of her ability and to protect, 
preserve, and defend the Constitution, the public official is 
promising to protect, preserve, and defend the public trust as an 
aspect of American constitutional law.  Consequently, every 
time a public official acts with disloyalty toward the public by 
damaging the public trust, the public official is breaking her 
promise. 
Another source for the duty of loyalty is the public duty 
doctrine borrowed from tort law.  The public duty doctrine 
provides that a government entity cannot be held liable for harm 
caused to an individual resulting from a government official or 
employee’s breach of duty owed to the public.55  In essence, 
where the governing body has a duty to the public at large, the 
state is immune from liability to individual plaintiffs.56  If a duty 
is not established constitutionally or statutorily, a duty can be 
established under the public duty doctrine in two ways: (1) 
affirmative conduct by the governing body or (2) when the 
governing body does not perform a required act.57 
 
52 ROHR, supra note 49, at 69; 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers & Employees § 
124 (1997). 
53 See 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 124. 
54 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the 
Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 425, 429–31, 441 (1989); see also Gregory A. 
Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for 
Augmenting Streamflows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 35 (1996). 
55 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 33, at 1265. 
56 Karen L. Golan, Court Reports, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 581, 645 (2003). 
57 Jason E. McCollough, Note, State Tort Liability for Failure to Protect Against 
Bioterrorism, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 743, 770 (2003). 
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Two key points demonstrate the differences and similarities 
between the doctrines of public trust and public duty.  First, the 
public duty doctrine offers immunity to the governing body if an 
individual is harmed as a result of government negligence.  
However, in the public trust scenario, everybody, meaning the 
public at large, is harmed. 
Second, a public duty can be established by either government 
action or inaction under the public duty doctrine.58  Thus, a 
government official can be held liable under the public duty 
doctrine for failing to take action.  Similarly, public trust assets 
and beneficiaries are harmed by government action and inaction.  
For instance, the salmon population in the Pacific Northwest has 
been greatly harmed by government action permitting activities 
that are known to be harmful to the fish.59  On the other hand, 
the nation’s air continues to become so polluted that it is toxic to 
humans and animals due to government inaction to force higher 
standards and cleaner technology.60 
In sum, the public duty doctrine provides a framework for 
assigning the government’s duty of loyalty to the public trust.  As 
discussed, many sources impose a duty of loyalty on public trust 
trustees: historical common law, Indian culture and governance, 
oaths of office, and the public duty doctrine.  Consequently, 
there should be no doubt that the duty of loyalty is an integral 
part of the trustee’s duties to protect the public trust. 
V 
TRUSTEE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Because of the trustee’s duty of loyalty, the trustee must act 
only in the best interest of the beneficiaries in administering the 
trust.  In other words, all decisions and actions affecting the trust 
must be made for the purpose of protecting, preserving, 
defending, and increasing the trust’s productivity.  That idea 
seems straightforward, but in the context of the public trust, the 
situation is much more complex because the trustees are public 
officials operating in a political world that is further complicated 
by U.S. administrative law.  Under the modern political 
 
58 Id.  
59 E.g., Wood, supra note 1, at 266–67. 
60 See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (order granting defendant-polluter’s motion to dismiss) . 
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structure, it is both ironic and puzzling that the sovereign, which 
holds our fragile natural resources in trust, is comprised of 
individuals who are also active players in the game of politics.  
Thus, we have appointed trustees that are entrenched in 
personal and political conflicts of competing interests.  To better 
understand this dynamic, it is necessary to examine self-interest 
and political-interest conflicts, as well as the conflicts that arise 
in the present political and administrative structure. 
When a public official takes office, the official assumes a 
fiduciary duty that requires the official to act in the best interest 
of the public.61  A conflict of interest develops when the official 
has personal interests that are contrary to the official’s public 
duties and interests.62  However, public officials are charged with 
the development of policy, and policy development involves 
political bargaining and positioning, which is typically driven by 
personal and political interests.  Thus, there are two types of 
conflicts that confront a public official: personal and political.  
The tricky task is determining where a personal conflict of 
interest begins and a political one ends.  There are often no clear 
lines because these types of conflicts are often entangled with 
one another. 
It is a clearly defined rule that if there is potential for a trustee 
to act in his or her own self-interest or in conflict with the 
interests of the trust, the trustee may be held liable for breaching 
his or her duty to the trust.63  Additionally, courts have held that 
a public officer’s official actions must remain uninfluenced by a 
private motive or interest.64  This idea is particularly critical in a 
public trust context if the purpose of the trust is to be served.  
Nonetheless, public officials make decisions everyday that are 
counter to public trust principles due to conflicts of interest–
yet, public officials are not held accountable.  Is this because we 
have come to accept that our trustees are politicians and politics 
trump trust duties?  Or is it because as citizens we have become 
 
61 Debra S. Weisberg, Note, Eliminating Corruption in Local Government, 17 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 303, 305 (1993). 
62 Id. at 304. 
63 Kapsak, supra note 35, at § 2; see also Jefferson Nat’l Bank v. Cent. Nat’l 
Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1152 (7th Cir. 1983). 
64 E.g., S & L Assocs. v. Township of Wash., 160 A.2d 635, 644 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1960); see also Weisberg, supra note 61, at 305. 
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apathetic to government and no longer demand accountability as 
we once did? 
Conflicts of interest are profuse at the administrative level of 
government as well.  This is partly because in a public trust 
context, public administrators are agents of the trustees.65  In a 
private trust, trustees have no power to delegate the duties of the 
trust that require judgment and discretion.66  This is impractical 
in the public trust context because the trust duties apply to all 
sovereigns at federal, state, and local levels and each level needs 
administrators and agencies to carry out their policies.67 
No court has specified that one sovereign or one body of 
government is responsible for ensuring that trustees properly 
manage the trust.  For instance, the chief executive (either at the 
state or federal level) is a trustee to the public trust.  It is 
appropriate for the executive branch to make policy addressing 
issues that require resolution of competing interests because the 
chief executive is accountable to the people.  Knowing that the 
chief executive cannot undertake all state matters alone, it is 
appropriate for him to delegate to agencies, including trust 
responsibilities. 
Also, the public trust is similar to the Indian Lands Trust in 
that the trust preempts all other statutes, thus, acting as a 
blanket to all sovereign responsibilities affecting the trust.68 As 
Professor Mary Wood explained: 
 Each federal agency is bound by this trust responsibility. 
Federal agencies must respond to the independent obligations 
the trust duty forms . . . . [T]his trust responsibility can be 
thought of as an interstitial body of law that, when applied in 
 
65 See Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive’s Trust Responsibility 
Toward the Native Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the 
Clinton Administration’s Promises and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 743–44 
(1995). 
66 In re Hartzell’s Will, 192 N.E.2d 697, 706 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963); Kapsak, supra 
note 35, at § 2. 
67 See generally City of Albuquerque v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 79 P.3d 
297, 306 (N.M. 2003) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984)).  Similarly, it is entirely appropriate for legislative 
bodies to make decisions on issues that impact the public trust because it is thought 
that those decisions closely mirror the public will.  Richard J. Lazarus, Changing 
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 654 (1986). 
68 See Wood, supra note 65, at 743–44. 
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concert with applicable statutes, imposes on agencies a duty to 
protect tribal interests in carrying out general statutory 
mandates. . . . The law is settled that federal agencies cannot 
abrogate or extinguish the trust relationship, or violate treaty 
rights, though courts still allow Congress such plenary power.69 
Consequently, assuming the trustee provides mandates for 
how the trust activities are to be executed, administrative 
agencies are authorized to act on behalf of the trustee.  
Administrative law is premised on the notion that agencies are 
to carry out their purposes in a neutral manner, while also 
allowing agencies discretionary authority.70 
But it is within this administrative discretionary authority that 
conflicts of interest abound.  For example, at the federal level, 
Congress enacts statutes that give administrative agencies 
incredible discretionary authority to implement policies and 
programs.  Some argue it is the discretionary authority granted 
to administrators that does the most damage to public trust 
assets.71  The problem with administrative discretion is that 
administrators are not shielded from political conflicts of 
interests, even though they were originally intended to be.  In 
fact, it can be argued that administrators are in a worse position 
than elected officials when it comes to being led by personal and 
political interests.  Whereas elected officials are intended to be 
checked by the people, administrators are checked by elected 
officials with whom they may never meet but are frequently 
reminded for whom they work. 
In addition, the public is not likely to hear about what 
happens at the administrative level.  Accordingly, if the elected 
official is more interested in economic opportunities that will 
release toxic particles into the air rather than protecting public 
trust assets, the administrator may find himself influenced by his 
own personal and political interests.  Specifically, the 
administrator has a personal interest in keeping his job.  The 
administrator knows that if he challenges the elected official’s 
interest in the economic opportunity, it may likely be the end of 
his career, or he may find his position transferred elsewhere.  In 
 
69 Id. 
70 Wood, supra note 1, at 254 (citing David Schoenbrod, The EPA’s Faustian 
Bargain, REGULATION, Fall 2006, at 39, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ 
regulation/regv29n3/v29n3-5.pdf). 
71 See id. at 252. 
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essence, this administrator gives little (if any) consideration to 
the public trust because it appears removed, whereas his 
livelihood and career are right in front of him.  Therefore, 
agency decision making is often guided not by legislative 
mandates but by a fear of personal losses.72 
The argument is not that administrators and agency staff do 
not want to protect trust assets; it is likely that most of them do.  
The problem is that administrators and agency staff are well 
aware of political realities and of who approves their paychecks.  
The following examples of administrative conflicts of interests 
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and in the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provide illustrations. 
Congress adopted the ESA in 1973 for the purpose of 
identifying, protecting, and rehabilitating species that were in 
danger of extinction.73  The ESA established the “jeopardy 
standard,” which allows federal officials to assess whether 
proposed or existing actions adversely impact species listed as 
“endangered” under the ESA.74  The ESA prescribes a 
mandatory consultation process where the jeopardy standard is 
the only tool for determining the legality of federal actions that 
affect listed species.75  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
administers the ESA in conjunction with the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS).76  The problem with administrative 
enforcement of the ESA is that Congress refrained from 
defining the jeopardy standard, so it is left up to the discretion of 
the FWS and NMFS to interpret and apply the standard.77  
Therefore, FWS and NMFS must determine if an activity will 
jeopardize a listed species and, ultimately, if the activity may 
begin or continue. 
 
72 Id. at 257 (quoting Zach Welcker, Cultivating Corridors for the People: The 
Next Twenty-Five Years, Welcome Speech at the University of Oregon School of 
Law Public Interest Environmental Law Conference (Mar. 1, 2007), in 22 J. ENVTL. 
L. & LITIG. 197, 198 (2007)). 
73 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006); see Daniel J. Rohlf, 
Jeopardy Under the Endangered Species Act: Playing a Game Protected Species 
Can’t Win, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 114, 114–15 (2001). 
74 Rohlf, supra note 73, at 114. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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Daniel J. Rohlf, a law professor at Lewis and Clark College, 
argues that the ESA’s jeopardy standard fails to provide 
“workable protections” for listed species for several reasons, 
including a lack of biological standards and conflicting scales of 
analysis.78  Without these guidelines, Rohlf argues, agencies 
administering the ESA are able to employ large amounts of 
“unfettered discretion.”79  The result of this unfettered discretion 
is a constantly evolving definition of the jeopardy standard, 
which swings with shifts in politics, and rare occurrences where a 
jeopardy opinion stops activities that are known to be 
endangering listed species.80  A FWS study over a six-year period 
found that the Agency issued only 150 jeopardy biological 
opinions out of 2719 formal consultations and 94,113 informal 
consultations.81  Furthermore, the Agency found only fifty-four 
activities that jeopardized a listed species.82 
Applying this example to the public trust (wildlife is a public 
trust asset), it is quite clear by the numbers alone that agency 
discretion resulted in harm to trust assets more often than not.  
Rohlf discussed the competing economic interests that were 
present during the six-year period of the study, and he concluded 
that the economic interests almost always won.83  Although 
economic interests are often termed “competing” interests, in 
the case of the public trust the accurate term is “conflicting 
interests.” 
In another and more recent example involving the ESA, the 
Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) found that a former deputy assistant secretary of the 
FWS used improper political and personal influences to limit 
protections to endangered and threatened species.84  It was 
determined that eight decisions by the former deputy required 
further review by the FWS because improper influences may 
 
78 Id. at 163. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. at 162–63. 
81 Id. at 151 n.153. 
82 Id. 
83 See generally id. 
84 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE: 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT DECISION MAKING, 6–8 (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08688t.pdf. 
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have compromised the scientific bases of those decisions and had 
a potentially negative impact on the affected species.85  The 
deputy has since resigned as a result of congressional 
investigations and criticism, but, unfortunately, the resignation 
came too late to prevent further harm caused to the species 
affected by the eight improper decisions.86 
The public trust blankets all federal law; therefore, it is 
intended to preempt all other actions that conflict with the 
trust’s interests.  So why do we allow public agencies, under 
legislative mandates, to harm trust assets repeatedly and not 
even suggest liability?  The next example may help answer this 
question. 
The EPA is the only federal agency with the authority to 
regulate carbon dioxide emissions.87  The EPA has the authority 
to grant or deny permits for an activity based on the type and 
amount of toxic pollutants the polluter will release into the air.88  
Despite being charged with protecting air quality, the EPA 
continues to grant permits for activities that it knows will release 
toxins into the air.89 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts sued the EPA for not 
regulating greenhouse gases from new automobiles under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA).90  The D.C. Circuit Court held that the 
EPA had the discretion to decide not to use its authority granted 
under the CAA to regulate greenhouse gases.91  The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and found that the EPA’s 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new cars 
was “unambiguous,” but the Court also found that the EPA was 
only responsible for regulating greenhouse gas emissions if the 
Agency determined that such emissions endangered public 
health and welfare.92  The process for that determination was 
 
85 Id. at 2. 
86 Id. at 6; see also Congress Investigates MacDonald’s Farm, ENV’T NEWS 
SERVICE, May 21, 2007, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may2007/2007-05-21        
-06.asp. 
87 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
88 See generally id. § 7410. 
89 Wood, supra note 1, at 256. 
90 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1438 
(2007). 
91 Id. at 57–58. 
92 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460, 1462 (2007). 
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remanded to the EPA.93  In essence, the Court deferred to 
agency discretion, ignoring the harm being caused to the public 
trust. 
Even more recently, EPA Administrator Stephen L. Johnson 
denied California’s bid to implement its own global warming 
laws despite support for the laws by leading scientists.  Johnson 
stated that the EPA’s decision was due in part to the assertion 
that global warming is a worldwide problem and requires a 
nationally led solution, not a state-led solution.94  However, 
thirteen states have chosen to adopt California’s standards, if 
approved, and others are considering following.95  Mary Nichols, 
chairwoman of the California Air Resources Board, estimated 
that “[i]f all 50 states adopted California’s law, it would reduce 
the amount of carbon dioxide emissions by 1.4 gigatons, about 
twice what the federal standards would achieve [by 2009].”96 
EPA scientists and staff publicly condemned Johnson’s 
decision and alleged that he ignored unanimous staff 
recommendations to grant California’s request.97  Members of 
Congress have threatened to subpoena EPA staff reports to 
uncover whether corruption in the executive branch was to 
blame for this decision, which was “not supported by the facts, 
by the law, by the science, or by precedent.”98  Senator Sanders, 
an Independent from Vermont, said “[t]his administration has 
 
93 Id. at 1463. 
94 Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
Governor, State of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/ 
climate/20071219-slj.pdf; see also Margot Roosevelt, Boxer Decries ‘Outrageous’ 
EPA Emissions Decision, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at B3. 
95 ARIZONA PIRG EDUCATION FUND, THE CLEAN CARS PROGRAM 1 (2008), 
http://www.arizonapirg.org/issues/clean-cars-for-arizona (follow “Background on 
Clean Cars, April 2008” hyperlink under “Resources”). 
96 Roosevelt, supra note 94. 
97 Letter from Coal. of EPA Labor Unions, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, to 
Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA (Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://www.peer.org/ 
docs/epa/08_24_1_epa_union_ltr.pdf; see also Press Release, Pub. Employees for 
Envtl. Responsibility, EPA Scientists Condemn Agency’s Greenhouse Gas Waiver 
Denial (Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row 
_id=978. 
98 Press Release, Majority Members of the U.S. Senate Comm. on Env’t & Pub. 
Works, Boxer Statement on California Waiver Decision Documents (Jan. 23, 2008), 
available at http//:epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Majority.Press 
Releases (browse press releases by “January” and “2008”; then follow “Boxer 
Statement on California Waiver Decision Documents” hyperlink). 
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taken the word ‘environment’ out of ‘Environmental Protection 
Agency.’”99  Senator Lautenberg, a Democrat from New Jersey, 
summed it up best: “It’s bad enough when the federal 
government fails to lead.  But it’s even worse when the federal 
government gets in the way of states that are trying to act in the 
interest of the public and in the absence of leadership from the 
EPA.”100  But what the EPA staff and Congress have failed to 
notice is that the EPA’s decision is an extreme violation of the 
trustees’ duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries of the public trust.  
Such action in a private trust would never be tolerated; it must 
not be tolerated here. 
Through its inaction, the EPA has harmed not only public 
health and welfare but also an essential component of the public 
trust.  This harm has not gone unnoticed.  Recently, the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, comprised 
of the world’s leading scientists, issued a warning on climate 
change.  The Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed 
the panel saying, “only urgent, global action will do.”101  The 
report predicted widespread water shortages across the globe, 
heat waves of increased intensity and duration, and floods 
caused by rivers and oceans.102  The report called for a 
stabilization of carbon emissions, mainly from fossil fuels, by 
2015, and noted that although the United States produces the 
most emissions it remains passive in instituting change.103  If the 
United Nations is calling for a global response because of the 
adverse affects that global warming will have on civilization, it is 
hard to understand why the EPA has been unable to determine 
that greenhouse gas emissions are harmful to the public’s health 
and welfare. 
One reason for EPA inaction could be the fact that it is part of 
the George W. Bush administration.  This administration has not 
 
99 Richard Simon, Hearing Grows Warm for EPA Chief, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2008, at A13. 
100 Id. 
101 Ban Ki-moon, Sec’y-Gen., U.N., Secretary-General’s Address to the IPCC 
Upon the Release of the Fourth Assessment Synthesis Report (Nov. 17, 2007), 
available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2869. 
102 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, U.N., CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 49 (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment -report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
103 Id. at 66 n.29. 
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been overly concerned with environmental issues.104  Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the EPA has refrained from citing 
environmental harms.  Consequently, EPA’s silence leads to the 
conclusion that administrators at the EPA are cognizant of the 
harm being caused by new automobile greenhouse gas emissions 
but remain silent because of their personal interests and fear of 
repercussions from political interests.  Once again, we see how 
the presence of political and personal conflicts of interest, 
present in all branches and levels of government, damages the 
public trust. 
Pursuant to the premise of administrative law, the EPA, as an 
administrative agency, is supposed to be shielded from politics.  
Instead, some argue that the EPA insulates politicians from 
responsibility.105  In today’s political climate, can an 
administrative agency ever be truly isolated from politics?  It is 
not likely, unless Congress develops a heavy-handed doctrine of 
administrative autonomy and holds politicians responsible for 
creating and acting upon conflicts of interest. 
VI 
TYING IT ALL TOGETHER 
So how does all of this fit together?  The public trust doctrine 
is an implied constitutional doctrine that charges the sovereign 
as trustee with holding natural resources in trust for the 
protection and preservation of these assets for future 
generations.  As trustee, the sovereign has a duty of loyalty to 
act only in the best interests of the public as trust beneficiaries.  
Because the public trust doctrine blankets the entire federal 
government (and in many states the state government), trustees 
have a duty to protect the trust against all harm resulting from 
conflicting federal statutes and actions.  This duty includes 
protection from harms caused presently and in the future by 
climate change.  Unfortunately, the sovereign appears to be 
generally ignoring its trust duties as evidenced in the ESA and 
EPA examples and thus breaching its duty of loyalty to trust 
 
104 See generally ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE (2004) 
(claiming that federal agencies under the George W. Bush administration have 
handed out permits, among other unprincipled actions, to campaign contributors 
allowing them to cause environmental harm). 
105 Schoenbrod, supra note 70, at 39. 
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beneficiaries.  Consequently, while many people in the United 
States turn their heads, our trust assets are being mortally 
harmed and depleted.  If we are going to live as healthy and 
civilized societies in the years to come, we must draw the 
attention of public trust trustees now, hold them liable for the 
harm to the public trust resources that they have allowed or have 
authorized, and make many changes as a government and 
individuals. 
Citizens may no longer sit passively and assume that the 
sovereign is protecting their natural resources.  We must demand 
more from our elected officials in environmental protection and 
force immediate changes in environmentally harmful activities.  
Individual voluntary efforts have proven to be not enough to 
counteract climate change.  Therefore, citizens must rise up and 
demand government to lead and take action.  Without 
government leadership engaged in forcing change, all other 
individual efforts will be futile.  Because the United States is a 
leader in carbon emissions, it should lead the fight against 
climate change and use its strong position to force societal and 
technological changes.  After all, it is government’s fundamental 
duty to provide for the health and welfare of its citizens. 
But this leads to the inquiry of how to get the sovereign to pay 
attention to climate change.  First, all branches of government 
and all levels of government must be engaged in the pursuit of 
protecting public trust assets from further environmental harms.  
Therefore, the people need to hold the executive and legislative 
branches of government, at all levels, responsible for continuing 
to allow harm to the public trust.  We need to be aware of and 
speak out against public officials who know that their actions will 
result in harm to trust assets but undertake such actions any way.  
We must use judicial actions to force trustees to pursue trust 
interests more aggressively and hold them accountable for 
statutory violations and abuses of authority. 
Second, we must no longer allow conflicts of interest to hide 
behind the veil of politics or accept these conflicts as just the way 
politics work.  If we continue to allow this political dynamic to 
occur, government will continue to serve private interests at the 
expense of the public’s interest in public trust assets.  This holds 
true for administrative agencies as well.  The public must 
demand agency autonomy in carrying out agency discretion 
because, if this is allowed, most administrators may no longer 
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fear personal losses resulting from doing what is best for the 
trust.  I truly believe that most administrators want to do what 
they are legislatively charged with doing but do not feel that they 
can with politics being ever present. 
Third, the government must force changes in activities by 
outlawing and enforcing harmful actions.  History tells us this 
can be accomplished.  For instance, Americans supported the 
bans on asbestos and leaded gasoline once they understood that 
those substances were detrimental to public health.106  In the 
automobile industry alone, technology exists for automobiles 
that produce less carbon emissions; yet, the EPA, Congress, and 
the judiciary refuse to mandate that automobile manufacturers 
move entirely to this technology, citing economic interests and 
concerns.  Ultimately, these government decisions have favored 
short-term economic benefits over the long-term sustainability 
of civilization. 
Finally, we must hold trustees liable when they breach their 
public trust duties by diminishing public trust assets.  This is the 
most likely mechanism to attract the government’s attention.  In 
a private trust, the threat of personal liability deters and detracts 
trustees from engaging in decisions and activities that would 
breach their duty of loyalty.  Because no public trust trustee has 
been held liable for the damage his decisions and actions have 
caused to the trust, there is no incentive for public officials to 
choose long-term climate-change-reversing actions over short-
term political and economic gains.  We must allow the public 
trust doctrine to trump all other federal actions that threaten the 
trust assets and hold trustees personally liable for harm they 
induce or allow to impact the trust assets.  In the role of trustee, 
there is no place for politics, and individuals and governments 
must demand that politics be set aside when public officials act 
in their capacity as public trust trustees. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
Climate change is directly damaging and depleting natural 
resources that are held in trust under the public trust doctrine.  
The public trust doctrine saddles the sovereign as trustees with a 
 
106 Wood, supra note 1, at 251. 
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duty of loyalty to act only in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries.  However, public officials in all branches and levels 
of government are breaching this duty by allowing conflicts of 
interest to influence their decision making.  Personal and 
political conflicts of interest interfere with administrative agency 
discretion resulting in decisions that ultimately harm trust assets.  
The impacts of climate change are already being felt and will 
only worsen.  Citizens must force government to address the 
present and future impacts of climate change and to carry out 
their duties as trustees of the public trust.  The climate change 
crisis has reached critical levels, and Americans must embrace 
the public trust if future generations are to exist in a civil 
environment.  We must demand that public officials take off 
their political hats, put on their public trust trustee hats, and take 
immediate action.  If public officials fail to take responsibility, 
personal liability should become a reality. 
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